

Affectivity and the Body

Prologue to a Theory of Incarnate Existence¹

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The first sense to ignite, touch is often the last to burn out; long after our eyes betray us, our hands remain faithful to the world.

Frederick Sachs²

Introduction

It is a cool morning in March as I slowly wake up to a new day, my body melding with the warm bed that offers refuges from the chill of the dawn. I roll over and notice that she is still here, this mysterious woman that I have lived with for many years. Her bare back looks cold and thus it *invites* me to slide closer and to pull the covers over it. As I do, my hand comes to rest on her shoulder. Slowly she comes to life, takes my hand, and pulls it around her stomach as she leans into me.

You may be a bit curious as to what happens next . . . but I am afraid that I will have to disappoint you. For this lecture is concerned only with these first few moments, with the initial awakening of affection, or, to put it in the bloodless language of philosophy, with the setting conditions under which we become caught up in desire, one of what Descartes called the primary passions.³ Desires are connected in some mysterious way to something broader in scope, to awareness and then to *feelings*. These will fall within our purview and I will be pressing for an account that uses them to discover the internal connection between consciousness and the body. But I can only wait for another occasion to build a bridge to a nuanced account of the emotions proper.

A. Intentionality and the Question of Self-awareness

What might have become a morning of wild embraces began with a simple act of perception. It seems that philosophers have been far more willing to speak about the latter than the former, for it has received

enthusiastic attention ever since the days of Aristotle's account in *De Anima*, while the turbulent waters of the emotions have been give over to the poets and novelists to navigate. For the moment, we too will stay on safe ground.

The decisive breakthrough in our more recent efforts to understand perceptual experience was the development of the theory of intentionality, initiated by Brentano, achieved by Husserl and suggestively extended by Heidegger. In place of retelling this history or offering a detailed analysis of the structure of intentionality, I will introduce only those concepts that gravitate around the recent discussion of self-awareness, for this issue, much to our surprise, gives us our best purchase on the internal connection between consciousness, affectivity and the body.⁴

Intentionality theory understands the nature of consciousness in terms of an interrelation between acts of consciousness and objects of consciousness, between undergoing various types of apprehensions and those matters or facts that give such apprehensions their anchor and task, between what Husserl was tempted to call "immanence" and "transcendence" in an effort to cast it in the most inclusive terms. If we take acts that present (p) an object (x) "bodily" as our paradigm, I want to claim that we are directly aware of undergoing the mental act. Self-awareness, to put it in its simplest terms, is the lived-through quality (*erleben*) of an experience (*Erfahrung*) intending an object. To say that all acts consist of consciousness-of, then, is to say that acts are always p-of-x, the object experienced is always x-for-p, and that we are directly aware of undergoing an intentional event.

(1) P-of-x

As interrelated, however, experience is directed-toward by being involved-with the way the object is present. In order to capture the sense in which consciousness is not Hume's theatre on which various impressions and ideas are linked by auto-constitution into bundles called objects, we will tentatively treat acts as syntheses and objects as imbued with a significance (*Sinn*) that accounts for their intelligible appearance, for the fact that the x is always x-as-y. These are what are commonly called the *qualities* or determinations of the object

(2) P-of-x-as-y

The surface structure of intentionality, at least for perception, is p-of-x-as-y. A minimal theory of intentionality has, as its core, the thesis that x-as-y is the structure of the x with which p is involved and

that p-of-x makes possible having x-as-y. To crib a couple of Kantian terms, without x being x-as-y all p-of-x would be empty, without p being p-of-x, all p would be blind.

This flurry of concepts immediately gives rise to numerous questions but we will concentrate on the following two clusters, which help us specify the issues at hand, as they take us a step closer to our goal of introducing the internal link between consciousness, the body and affectivity.

1. We just suggested that to understand experiences as acts of consciousness is to understand them as imbued with a certain lived-through quality. But acts involve attention and our attention is fully captured by the object that we are experiencing and not by the act that is undergoing the experience. How can we claim that we are also aware of the act? How can we account for its lived-through quality? How is the experience as lived-through itself structured?
2. A first analysis of acts and intentionality is provisionally restricted to the field of consciousness and, at first, does not require us to include the body as an essential feature of the account. But might not this first account give rise to a second once we understand the way in which self-awareness is not simply a feature of acts but is related to the interplay of acts and actions? And might not the analysis of actions give us an internal connection to the way in which the body not only underlies but also frames our perceptual involvement with things in our environments and, indeed, the life of consciousness itself?

We need to deepen our account of the problem we are after with this second cluster of questions. While the connection between acts and actions might give us an account of how consciousness is necessarily embodied, it does not bring the body within the circuit of object- and then self-awareness. And how could it? The body according to most accounts is physical, consciousness not. The bio-chemical and neural states of the body are understood as the cause of consciousness and thus as either a material or staging condition of consciousness. The body is treated as essential to our experience of objects in the sense that without it there would be no neural circuits and synaptic discharges causing of such experiences. But it itself would fall outside the circuit of awareness that attends experience and thus belong to neurology, not phenomenology.⁵ The outcome of this approach is that consciousness is

treated as embodied without itself being bodily, a framework that reaches all the way back to Plato and continues in our day to control even those accounts that refuse to take refuge in a reductive functionalism or eliminative materialism. But is this correct? Is there a way in which the body is essential to our experience of objects in the sense that it frames or is ingredient in the lived-through quality of the experience? Is there something about the self-awareness that attends experience that requires us to understand consciousness itself not just as embodied but as essentially bodily?

This lecture builds toward answering these last questions in the affirmative and thereby providing a characterization of consciousness very different from the one found in Modern Philosophy in general and in current discussions in particular. This lecture can only provide a first point of access and then a *Leitfaden*; it would require much more to make good on its promises. But what it lacks in depth and even style, it hopes to gain in breadth and clarity by providing a precise account of some of the first steps on the way toward a theory of incarnate existence.

B. Self-awareness and Reflexivity

The thesis that we become aware of an intentional act, what is called self-awareness, only in a second act that takes the first as its explicit theme is the core of what called the *reflection* theory. The critique of reflection theory is well developed and need not detain us here. The crucial flaw in its approach to self-awareness, to put it in a single sentence, is that it must account not only for the awareness that we have of the initial act and then the act of reflection but also for the identification of the two acts as both being self-aware, and it must do so without introducing a third act that effects this identification, for that only sets us on the path to an infinite regress.⁶ In contrast to reflection theory, it has been argued that self-awareness is not itself the product or effect of an act of reflecting upon experience, but rather is an immediate and thus undeniable feature of experience. If our intentional events lacked self-awareness, there would be nothing for our subsequent reflections to uncover. But what is not so well understood is precisely what self-awareness is and what it includes.

The thesis generally accepted is that any act of presenting an object includes not just an awareness of the object but also an immediate awareness of the experience presenting the object. There is not the act

and then the awareness. To undergo and have an act is to undergo and have act-awareness. Awareness attends acts. The two are achieved together.

But are not acts turned to or directed toward objects? Let us say at the outset that we do not restrict the meaning of object (*Gegenstand*) to things, to items having physical properties, but use the term in a broad sense to cover any item that "stands-against" (*Gegenstand*) and yet is encompassed by our experiences. Things, properties, relations, events and, perhaps, facts all qualify. To return to our question, is not our awareness focused upon and even consumed with objects? Why say that we are aware of anything other than the interplay of profiles, objects and their backgrounds? Why think of the acts as self-aware?

To capture the difference in play, we must make a distinction between the *explicit* awareness we have of objects and the *implicit* or *tacit* awareness we have of our experiences of objects. Explicit awareness is really attention and it is truly lost in the matter at hand. We do not attend to the acts as they are produced or undergone. Attention, however, does not exhaust the scope of awareness. While our acts are not in focus or "thematic," we are cognizant or mindful of them. In attending to objects we are simultaneously aware of our experiences of objects. As objects are presented, acts of presenting are co-present and we have tacit p-awareness. P-awareness is what is meant by speaking of an act as an *Erlebnis*, as a lived-through-experience.

This is familiar territory for self-awareness theory and so it is easy to miss a difficulty in the account. If we take p-of-x as the basic structure of an experience of an object, we can press the question of just what is covered by self-awareness. Clearly objects are not covered, as we have just shown, for acts are directed toward them and they, in some sense, transcend acts. If we claimed that objects were manifest in self-awareness, we would fall into some version of subjective idealism or Humean phenomenalism. An object lacks the feature of being for-itself and thus falls outside the scope of self-awareness. By contrast, it seems obvious that only the experience could be self-aware. Using the classic Modern distinction, presenting acts are understood as "subjective" in contrast to what captures their attention, which is "objective." As subjective, p is present to itself directly, without mediation. In addition, p is characterized as constituting, while x is constituted. P is productive in the sense of being intentionally directed toward x and, thus, is more than

just an abstract moment of p of x. As Zahavi puts it, "It is only by being tacitly aware of our own subjective perspective that we can refer indexically to objects and consequently perceive them."⁷

But, in fact, the question as to what is covered by self-awareness depends upon a prior commitment as to how one understands p of x. If p-of-x is understood as an intentional event having a unitary structure, as is generally recognized in self-awareness theory, then it would seem that while one can distinguish p from x, one cannot isolate p from the intentional state of p-of-x. Since x is essential to p-of-x, x would, in some sense, also be necessary *for* self-awareness, even though it does not *have* self-awareness. We are aware of it explicitly only as an object, not as an act. But without that x toward which the act is directed, the act itself would not exist or, at least, cease to have the kind of coherence that allows it to be self-aware. To capture this, I will say that intentionality has not only a pro-jective, transcending function but also a re-jective, *reflexive* feature. Structurally speaking, reflexivity means that acts are self-aware because in the very event of presenting an x they are present to themselves. In grasping the object, the act returns to itself. In presenting x p is co-present. Reflexivity should never be confused with reflection, which is always a second act that takes the first as its theme and thus is external to the inner structure of the initial act. Reflexivity, furthermore, entails that presentations of objects and events within different perceptual fields are structured in such a way that the fields presented contribute to the kind of self-awareness that attends the presentation.

The immediacy that attends self-awareness is not because the *erleben* of the act makes it a free standing qualia or event that sets it apart from its intentional object. Any contrasting moment in the structure of intentionality assumes a process of differentiation. It is "this" only by contrast to "that;" it is "here" only by contrast to "there." The fact that p is always p-of-x means that its experiential immediacy is ontically mediated by its position in the whole structure of intentionality. Paraphrasing Hegel, I have p only through another, namely through x. And I have x only through another, namely p.⁸ As soon as being lived-through is treated not as a noun but an adverb and thus parasitic upon experience, and as soon as the experience is understood as intentional in structure and thus deployed in a field of involvement, we can no longer treat self-awareness in isolation, as if being-self-conscious were not being-

self-consciously-experiencing-x. This structure is sufficient to distinguish *Erlebnisse* from what are usually called qualia.

We can take this idea a step further. Viewed concretely and not formally, self-awareness is not an isolated amorphous state but is always qualitatively differentiated according to the intentionality of acts. Acts fall, first of all, into certain cognitive modalities related to types of objects. They are acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, loving, hating, etc. But there is much more. If the act is intentional and if the living-through of the act just is self-awareness, then self-awareness, like a tuning fork, will be modulated by the noematic field for the simple reason that the act is always a p-of-x. And this entails that the type of self-awareness shifts according to what we would call the affective valences of the object (itself present or absent) being experienced.⁹ In addition to the *modalities* of the act, then, there are also the *modulations* of self-awareness and these modulations "resonate" the different felt qualities of the objects experienced. The notes of a guitar produce hearing as the modality of the act and, with that, a sensing of ourselves that is "mooded." The vibrant rhythm of a flamenco player has us feeling tall; the meandering and deep cords of a blues guitarist set us adrift. These modulations cling to the fringes of consciousness, often sending us running in directions that we do not choose. What I am suggesting, anticipating what we will cover in the next section, is that the features of the object within its background functionally interrelate with the quality of the self-aware experience and account for the atmosphere that encompasses them both.

If this analysis is correct, then what we are calling reflexivity involves two interlocking moments: (a) the self-awareness that attends p-of-x-as-y involves a *tacit* consciousness of the modal quality or qualities of the act; and (b) the self-awareness that undergirds p-of-x-as-y involves a *implicit* sensing of the modulational quality or qualities of the event of p-of-x-as-y.¹⁰ It is because of the cognitivist orientation of most contemporary philosophy that we fail to detect the second and even have difficulty recognizing the first.¹¹

There is, however, a serious problem with the way our analysis has run thus far. If we grant that self-awareness is not object-awareness and yet argue that self-awareness arises only from acts that are presentations of objects, this seems to entail that I need to have an object to which I am attending in order to have self-awareness. Even if we understand the difference between a present and absent object not as

the difference between a present object and a mental representation of an object, but as two modes in which intentional objects can exist, it seems that we have tethered the notion of self-awareness to us actually attending to objects (be they present or absent). Were there no object(s) being attended to, there would be no acts of presenting. Without an explicit act and a focal object, it looks like reflexivity and thus self-awareness could vanish into thin air. Is this where our analysis leaves us?

C. Rooting Reflexivity in Affectivity

Thus far we have made no mention of temporality and even now we can offer only the slimmest of accounts, just enough to carry our analysis of reflexivity a step further. Viewed temporally, all acts of presentation are acts that grasp something present in the Now. Presenting, then, is a rendering-present, a *Gegenwärtigung*, to use Husserl's term, and with him we want to understand the rendering-present not as a single impressional event but in terms of overlapping temporal syntheses of retention and protention. Because retention just is the present as it is slipping away, and protention just is the Now as it opens upon a future coming to us, each experience takes shape temporally only by being internally related to the stream of experiences in which it is embedded. In the tacit self-awareness we have of any given presentational experience we are undergoing, the experience is connected to a host of others that have just elapsed or are just arriving. Reflexivity, then, necessarily involves a tacit awareness of not just a singular intentional experience but also a stream of experiences. Each living-through, we can say, is nested; with each we are tacitly aware not just of a particular mental episode but also of the surrounding life of consciousness and possibly ourselves as conscious beings.

Our first account of reflexivity, then, was much too narrow. But this important extension of the notion of self-awareness is still one-sided, only noetic and not yet noematic. Perceiving an object is also accompanied by an awareness of the object's setting and, beyond that, its surroundings. Granted that we are not focused upon its environment when we perceive the knife that we use to peel the potato, it is but one of a number of kitchen utensils that we sense as being at hand. In the very action of using the knife we are simultaneously but obliquely aware of the table on which it stands, other knives that could be used in its

place, and the room that houses them all. So as to avoid confusing it with the *tacit* awareness of self-consciousness, let us speak of this as *marginal* awareness. All explicit awareness of objects is always accompanied by a marginal awareness of their environments. Just as the experience of viewing a wine glass carries a tacit awareness of the nexus of experiences in its wake, so that glass held up in a restaurant opens upon a surrounding world. And should we settle back after our meal and not directly attend to any one thing in particular, we still have a marginal awareness of our environment.

What this analysis points to is yet a third essential characteristic of intentionality that, until now, have keep at bay. In addition to the as-structure (x is always x-as-y) and the for-structure (x-as-y is always x-as-y-for-p) intentional objects and, by extension, the acts of perceiving intentional objects are always situated in a particular setting or, to put it in its most general form, in the world.¹² The in-structure is twofold. Each manifest object is always in the world; each x-as-y is always x-as-y-in-w. Yet we have already seen that x-as-y is necessarily situated in p-of-x-as-y. By implication, not only the object but also the entire event is organized by the in-structure: each p-of-x-as-y is always p-of-x-as-y-in-w.

(3) P-of-x-as-y-in-w

With this crucial addition comes a pressing question: how does the marginal awareness we have of the world relate to the tacit awareness we have of consciousness? To be more precise, what does the introduction of the in-structure tell us about the structure of reflexivity?

To capture this we must emphasize that the world is neither an object nor a fact in addition to all the others ones, nor should it be understood as the set or totality of all objects, events, and/or facts.¹³ Let us not misconstrue the grammar of the "in." We are not in the world the way the cat is in the box. In an effort to capture this difference philosophers like Husserl and Heidegger spoke of world as "horizon," as a nexus of meaning, and then supplied a rich analysis of various modalities of being-in. As our first account of reflexivity suggested, the fact that perceptual experiences subtend other types of experiences means that a receptivity to the way objects are manifest pervades them all. But even deeper than this is a certain openness to what surrounds those objects, to a background, even atmosphere, from which they emerge. Like air on a thick, humid day, this atmosphere soaks the whole of experience with an inescapable weight that permeates all that we see or feel. Let's speak

of this as *affectivity*. While the constitution of reflexivity is read off the interrelation between the as-structure and the for-structure, reflexivity is expanded into affectivity once we situate the as- and the for-structure within the in-structure. To be self-aware, then, is not only to have a tacit awareness of the quality of an act and its stream of related experiences but also to have a certain attunement or responsiveness to situations or environments that give experiences the atmosphere in which they live.¹⁴ Affectivity roots reflexivity in existence.

D. Affectivity and Action

The introduction of the world into our account of intentionality must be understood correctly. The fact that objects and facts are always situated *within* a world is made possible by the fact that the whole structure of p-of-x-as-y is itself *in* the world. Tracing the situational character of what is given *to* consciousness leads us to the horizontal character *of* consciousness. With the in-structure now in play, not only the intentional object but also the intentional act requires further discussion.

The account of acts offered thus far was restricted to ones that are reactive and not proactive, to ones that register as they are “drawn,” present as they are “pulled,” and often suffer as they are overwhelmed. But they do not yet rebuild or reshape. As such they are not yet constructive or productive. But the way we are actually involved with matters at hand contributes to the presence they have for us. Seeing sticks as swords is only possible for ones who engage in fighting and who take them as such while they marches off to battle, be it real or imaginary. And this entails that acts that are specimens of presenting are nested in acts as ways of handling or coming to grips with materials at hand. Acts, first of all, *act upon* and, as such, are *actions*. If the in-structure applies to the whole of intentionality and not just the objects of intentional acts, then intentionality understood as p-of-x-as-y is undergirded by involvement-in.¹⁵ It is only as a result of the child’s discovery of the mirror and then the acquisition of language that something like an interior space is opened in which acts can sometimes take refuge from their involvements and, in prouder moments, attempt to master actions. But even this takes place only against a backdrop of our being-in.

A richer definition of intentionality, then, must speak of acts-in-action or, at least, of an action that is taking place in the act, and might be formulated in this way:

(4) A-in-p-of-x-as-y-in-w

Any concrete intentional action would be situated between two limits, the first where the act (p modalized) alone define the action, and the second where the action alone defines the act. Our actions transform the world. Only here do we discover the proper sense of productivity. With its discovery we are now in a position to underwrite our very provisional account of intentionality: the being of intentionality is based on the interplay of affectivity and action. With the introduction of the notions of affectivity and action, we gain a richer understanding of the nature of involvement and the in-structure. As undergirded by affectivity, the world is *background*, the horizon *within* which our actions take place. As sustained by action, the world is *stage*, the ground *upon* which our actions stand. With actions in play our being-in becomes a being-beyond.

E. Self-awareness and Touch

Let us return to our opening scene. You will recall that I was touching her shoulder, which slowly came alive as she gradually woke and leaned into me. This experience involves various manifestations of the shoulder having a significance that integrates the variety of tactile sensations into determinate profiles of the object. The shoulder is soft, smooth, rounded and somewhat cool. I am captured by the texture and the contours of the surface. The hand, as it were, is itself gripped by what the shoulder offers it. Closing one's eyes only seems to focus this act of touching.¹⁶ While the shoulder occupies our attention, the experience is not completely lost; in the language that is now familiar to us, beneath the explicit awareness of the shoulder there is a tacit awareness of our touching it. But notice that in this case the act itself is deployed in the fingers, which are themselves alive with feelings. The fingers undergo sensings or sensuous feelings, what Husserl, who almost never coins new terms, called *Empfindnisse*.¹⁷ Every action of haptic touching is accompanied by a felt quality, but what makes these feeling so unique is that they place or "localize" the act, centering it, in this case, in the fingers. Without the fingers there would be no act. Without skin sensitivity and without skin events acts of touching would cease and, as a consequence, objects as touched would disappear. At the same time that

sensings "flow back" from the intentional object touched, they are dependent upon our bodies being intentionally involved in an environment. Here we have a paradigm case where, in being thematically focused on the touched and not what does the touching, the touched immediately returns touching to itself. This internal play of touching-touched-touching is a case of what Husserl somewhere calls "circular intentionality" and what we are attempting to snare with the notion of reflexivity. In being directed toward the world in acts of touching, sensings are the way that the world becomes directed toward us, "takes" us, and solicits our involvement. The somewhat rarified notions of reflexivity and affectivity introduced above now begin to take on flesh.

We must be careful not to mix different families of sensations here. As we saw early in this lecture, there are sensations that are ingredient in the profiles of objects, which, for their part, give us information about what is present. This is normally what we mean by tactile sensations. *Empfindnisse* or sensorial feelings are different. To be sure they are internally connected: were there no object touched, there would be no *Empfindnisse*. But they make possible the self-awareness that attends touching, not the thematic awareness of profiles and objects. Sensorial feelings, which arise here only in connection with the intentional act of touching, account for the way that such acts of touching are reflexive and, thus, self-aware. If this is the case, and if sensings also introduce a feature of "localization," then self-awareness is not only rooted in the body but in some sense includes the body within the circuit of awareness, an issue that will occupy us shortly.

In addition to the tactile sensations that form the "content" of profiles of manifest objects, and sensorial feelings that "place" the act in the body touching, there is yet a third set to which we must attend. The act of touching, we have seen, is also the *action* of touching. Generally, the action of touching is dynamic and, as such, is accompanied not only by sensations of exertion but also by sensations attending the movement of the body. These sensations, called kinaestheses or proprioceptive sensations, give us information about the (changing) positions of the hands, the contraction of the muscles, the gait of the body, its posture as it move, etc. In the case of touch, however, this information is a setting condition to the information we receive about objects. Without "joint sensitivity" objects would lose their place in our environment, precisely because our bodies would be incapable of standing-upright and moving about. But the relationship is reciprocal; to the extent that our

movements are bodily actions, they are solicited by our intentional involvement with matters in our surroundings.

While not in focus, the awareness we have of proprioceptive sensations is also tacit. But notice that self-awareness here is tied to the position of the hand and the extending of the arm, as the fingers glide across the top of the shoulder. Were kinaesthetic sensations lacking, we would be able to move our hand only by taking it up as an object of observation and commanding it to move. The action and the awareness of the action would both be a product of reflection, as in the case of I.W, the deafferented subject studied by Gallagher and Cole.¹⁸ In normal subjects, however, the self-awareness produced by the kinaestheses is simultaneously a type of body-awareness.

In touch self-awareness, then, consists of both sensorial feelings and kinaestheses. They are bound up with the actions of the body and both forms of self-awareness are forms of body-awareness, not in the sense that the body causes self-awareness---for we are not dealing with issues of causality here---but in the sense that self-awareness is "localized," is deployed across the body; it swells from its joints, muscles and skin. To sense oneself while touching an object is to sense the body. In touch, then, self-awareness is simultaneously body-awareness.

F. Depths of Touch

If we argue that particular types of perception do not reduce to specific, local receptors but are functional units that only require sufficient differentiation anatomically from others to be distinct, then behind the acts and actions of touching, enabling them, are two larger capabilities:

- On the one hand, there are *perceptual activities*, which are subroutines enabling the perceptual act as a whole, such as repetition (seeing the same thing), referral (seeing the whole on the basis of a side), and various kinds of transporting (spatial, dimensional, and temporal).¹⁹
- On the other hand, there are *body schemata*, which are typically distinct systems of bodily abilities and capabilities that enable movements and the maintenance of posture.²⁰ Proprioceptive sensations arise as “motor programs” are activated.

Though they clearly belong to the complex of consciousness as a system, types of perceptual activities and body schemata are an enabling

condition of the explicit awareness and the tacit self-awareness attending our acts and actions. As a result they themselves are not conscious, even implicitly. The explicit awareness that attends the act of touching, focused upon the shoulder, arises from perceptual and kinaesthetic data, from the sensing of contact and the sensing of movement that shape the action. At the same time, the systems organizing those data cannot be self-aware since both perceptual activities and body schemata belong to the realm of the possible, not the actual; to the realm of our capabilities, not experienced events. We possess these capacities but, as true of all dispositions, no awareness, not even tacit awareness, is involved. Let us think of them, accordingly, as *nonconscious*.

The distinction between what is conscious and what is nonconscious now enables us to characterize touch with more precision. Tactile experiences are framed by body schemata and perceptual activities, which are activated through proprioceptive sensations and perceptual data. It is the combination of information about the movement and coordination of parts of the body with information about the object coming through contact that accounts for the felt surfaces and qualities of the object of touch.²¹ In the haptic system perceptual acts are triggered by actual contact with the object, by the sensations that come from taking it to hand. The kinaestheses, by contrast, integrate the actions of the body with the acts of touching. As Gibson puts it, "The layout of physical surfaces . . . is perceived by way of the disposition of bodily members when touch and posture are covariant."

Including perceptual activities and body schemata in our account gives us the bridge to the idea that acts of touch are *spatial*. Acts of touching give us not only a sense of how the body is involved, communicated by the sensorial feelings, but also, within a background of perceptual activities, particular information about the manifest object. By contrast, the kinaestheses give us active information about the position and movement of the body organized by bodily schemata. While it would need much more analysis to give us purchase on these claims, body schemata organize the disposition of parts of the body as well as the movements of the body as a whole in relation to the world. Basic to all body schemata are certain lived *vectors* of the lived-body that compose its bearings and give it the basic relations of its own carriage. They are head-foot, side-side, and rear-aft. The body, however, is also engaged in environments, and thereby provides orientation to the objects of intentional acts to which we attention. The body undergirds the

constitution of the spatial field with its own *static coordinates* of top-bottom, left-right, back-front, near-far, and with its *dynamic coordinates* of upward-downward, leftward-rightward, closer-further. While vectors provide the spatial frame organizing the *body* sensed by the kinaestheses, coordinates establish the spatial maps of what is explicitly experienced of the *field* of our experience. As I am aware of the itch on my back, of lying at her side, and then her shoulder being higher than her neck, each of these “placings” already presupposes the systems of vectors and coordinates that makes them possible. With vectors and coordinates in play, acts of touch always entail that the one touching and the field open to touch are intrinsically spatial.

G. The Spatiality of Consciousness

Terms like immigration and naturalization assumes that we have a person from another place that then changes county and takes on a new citizenship. One cannot naturalize what does not already exist. There are any number of philosophical theories that, willingly or unwittingly, define the relationship between body and consciousness as one of "naturalization." What we are attempting to account for, however, is not the spatialization of consciousness, as if we have a consciousness that takes on spatial features by virtue of taking on a body, but the *spatiality* of consciousness, the sense in which it is inherently and essentially spatial.

Having shown that touch is reflexive in nature and having used this feature along with the kinaestheses to amplify the nature of body schemata, does this tell us anything about the structure of consciousness as a whole? There is good reason to think not. Though the divide between bodily existence and consciousness breaks down in the case of touch, it is only one among the other senses. If this is the case, we have not made much progress in our attempt to understand the bodily nature of consciousness in general and the roots of emotions in particular.

The standard interpretation of touch, going back to the Aristotle, is that it is one of five (and only five) senses and that it, like the others, functions to lift the sensible forms of the qualities of things into the realm of what the soul perceives.²² Our ordinary view today is not far from this. Touching is one among other perceptual activities, which are not directly dependent upon it. I can see, smell and hear without touching, even though extremes of bright lights, bad smells and loud

sounds, often found in college fraternities, seems to "hit" the body and cause it to recoil. Only tasting involves touch. But sight certainly does not, nor are the other senses of smell and hearing dependent upon it. But is this picture accurate? Have we not run the analysis at the level of fully developed and stable intentional acts and thereby missed what might be a deeper connection?

Interestingly enough, Aristotle himself takes us beyond the standard picture. In contrast to the other senses, touch involves a special medium, he suggests, for the body is composed of the earth, not air or water. He recognizes that touch has the unique feature of taking place not *by* the medium of something else (air and water) impinging on the organs (of sight, hearing and smell) but *along with* or in the medium (in this case, earth) that makes perception possible. Touch, like taste, is not just a matter of being affected by but also of being *assimilated* to what is touched. The "power of perceiving the tangible is seated inside" but, according to *De Anima*, it seems that this locus is understood as the inside or the underside of the skin or the flesh itself.²³ Unlike the media of air and water, the flesh allows for no gap, no distance between perceiving and perceived.

This difference between touch and the other senses might give us a key to the aesthetic dimensions of conscious life and the link between self-consciousness and body-consciousness. In closing this paper let me attempt to capture the sense in which perceptual consciousness as a whole is bodily.

The analysis of vectors and coordinates already begs us to extend it to all of consciousness. Since perceptual activities and body schemata are understood as dispositional capacities, they clearly attend all acts of perception, not just touch. Vectors are the operative dyads organizing kinaesthetic consciousness and thus it is spatial. Coordinates are the spatial dyads of the perceptual field rooted in the body's relation to it. In that the perceptual field is a field of consciousness, it too is spatial. Even vision, which tends to efface its vectors and privilege coordinates, requires movement and thus is never free from depending upon both. To cast this in more traditional language, vectors and coordinates are not "contents" but "forms." Experiencing according to a "form of intuition" does not presuppose an explicit awareness of that form, to paraphrase Kant for our own ends, but, if we are correct, it does presupposes that that form is rooted in the nature of consciousness.

Often times we are not engaged with things but have withdrawn from them to the balm of a bath or the quiet of a bed. As we are surrounded by warm water, the skin is in full contact with what supports it. When I woke up on that cool morning, the soft sheets wrapped the length of my body, from my head, down my shoulders, along the back and legs to my heels. Or we might be connected to nothing more than a surface bearing our weight, as a dancer whose position is frozen, anchored only by gravity²⁴

The account of perceptual experience and kinaesthetic sensations just offered opens upon yet another level, the deeper connection between the body and the environment. Touching, we are suggesting, is not just one act or even one perceptual modality among others but is contact. We must be careful not to speak of an act of touch at this level for nothing need be in focus. Here it is mostly a matter of being touched, of the body being surrounded or cradled or lifted or oppressed. Here *Empfindnisse* also account for the intersection of body and environment and thus for that bodily attunement and sentience underlying all sapience.²⁵ What is distinct about touch is its ubiquity.

Apart from any particular position or movement of the body (as a component of an action), and apart from any particular act of perception, there is a broader sense of touch that links us to the earth. The body is always touched. But notice that something very different comes in play here. Touch is not organ specific and thus not dependent upon a set of sensations specific to one part of the body.²⁶ The body as a whole, as “skin,” serves as its vehicle. The self-awareness I have is deployed: it is not just a form of self-presencing but a form of self-extension. To use terms that disrupt the way this has been thought in philosophies of consciousness, consciousness is not merely temporal, it is also spatial. What is in play here is not a reflexivity that ties self-awareness to intentionality but one that reaches deeper and connects reflexivity to our preconscious being-in-the-world.²⁷ We are calling it affectivity. In affectivity we share the flesh of the world.²⁸

The result of our account is to place the interplay of affectivity and body beneath the contrast between subject and object that is read from the structure of intentionality and thereby to transform the notion of consciousness. To the extent that consciousness is body-consciousness, our reflections upon consciousness always finds what is not one with itself, neither fully transparent subject nor fully constituted object. Consciousness is not fully subject in that its being depends upon

spatial coordinates that belong to the sphere of the constituted, to what is touched. It is not fully object in that its being depends upon vectors that ground objective coordinates and in that the touched is also touching. The "surplus" of touching over touched and of touched over touching means that as lived-body, consciousness is always "imperfectly constituted," as Husserl recognized in an especially lucid moment.²⁹

Footnotes

¹ This is a revised version of a lecture given in the Philosophy Department, Northwestern University, April 2, 2004.

² Sachs 1988.

³ To the extent that emotions are on the horizon of this paper, I have in view what Descartes calls the six basic or simple passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness) and Damasio the primary emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust). See Descartes 1985, I, 353 [§69] and Damasio 1999, 50).

⁴ The approach to the body in this paper is not, so to speak, from the bottom up but from the top down, through a phenomenological account of consciousness, that, in challenging the very framework in terms of which it has been and continues to be understood, discovers its internal connection to the body.

⁵ Flanagan, who is attuned to the importance and even necessity of phenomenology, holds this view. See Flanagan 1992.

⁶ On this issue see Henrich 1970, Frank 1991, and Zahavi 1999.

⁷ Zahavi 1999, 25.

⁸ Hegel [1807] 1952, 80.

⁹ This account is provisional as affective valences have not yet been accounted for and, in fact, cannot be accounted for until we introduce the notion of action. It would be a mistake to take them as "givens," as often happens, and then go on to defined for emotions as "reactions" to these valences. For a classic example of this see James 1884.

¹⁰ We have yet to give the account of modulation its proper grounding, a task that we will take up in the next section.

¹¹ But we must give a certain type of reflection its due. To say that I am directly acquainted with the cognitive experiences I am undergoing is not to say that the mental experience is *fully* given to me. To be aware of the act is not also to grasp the full range of its determinations or what influences the act. Having driven reflexivity and reflection apart and set

them over against each other, there is strong evidence to show that a certain kind of reflection can intervene and transform the quality of self-awareness that we have. One of the most striking cases of this comes from experiments on sexual arousal among heterosexual males. Scheier, Carver & Gibbons 1979. Male subjects are asked to report on the level of sex arousal after twice viewing a set of seven slides of female nudes under two different conditions, the first where the experimenter informs the subject that others who had viewed the slide did not really find them arousing at all, the second where the experimenter tells the subject that others found them really pretty arousing. Not surprising suggestions of high arousal induce reports of higher arousal (79% arousal rating) with suggestions of low arousal contributing to an awareness of low arousal (40% arousal rating). Scheier, Carver & Gibbons 1979, 1580.

What we are calling self-awareness does indeed possess the features of "ownness" but the tethering of experience to an intentional object and then to background means that experience is deployed across a social field and as such can be shaped by a kind of perception guided by questions, suggestions, and demands that are socially generated. The arousal rating jumps 40% when the subject is led to believe that peers find the slides highly erotic in contrast to not arousing. Whatever one claims about the immediacy of the conscious state of arousal, that immediacy does not involve incorrigibility nor is it incompatible with levels of intensity induced by social expectations

What is especially interesting about these experiments, however, is the change in arousal levels that occur when the subject sees a reflected image of himself in a mirror. The figures just given were for a first "non-mirror" group. The viewing screen for the second group is constructed in such a way that each subject sees the slides, then a mirror image of himself, and finally the second set of slides, each for 15 seconds. This way the subject viewing his body in the mirror does not distract from the slides and yet is looking at himself in the interval between the two showings. The "mirror" group dropped from 79% to 70% arousal in the high arousal suggestion group, but crept upward from 40% to 46% in the non-arousal group. Even though there is no physical change in the appearance of the body that correlates to the feeling of arousal, the gap closes to 24%.

We can say, without being mistaken, that this forced reflection of his body in the mirror establishes a counterweight to the power of

suggestion. While it does not fully overcome it, as seen by the 24% gaps that persists, it forces the subject to recenter on the quality of his own feeling rather than delivering it over to the hands of others. The presence of his own image sets up a visible counterpole to the invisible presence of his peers, and induces a kind of reflection that hones in on the quality of his arousal.

But the experience is more complex than this. What the subject sees is probably not his body or even his eyes. This may be a case of the gaze of the subject catching itself, almost by surprise. Here too there is a kind of reflexivity at work. It is not just that he sees himself reflected in the mirror but he reflexively senses himself seeing the slides and himself as well. The fact that what the gaze catches itself pushes this reflexive sensing into a reflective seeing that slackens the social cords binding affectivity to others and isolates feeling and perceptions from their dominion, an art that has been fully mastered by anorexics.

¹² We are purposefully leaving open the question as to what is meant by the term "world," introducing only a few preliminary characterizations that allow us to deal with the issue at hand. For a developed analysis see Welton 2000, chapters 13 to 15.

¹³ This issue is dealt with in Welton 2000, 81-87, 333-346, 399-404.

¹⁴ Husserl uses the terms affection (*Affektion*) and affectivity (*Affektivität*) and gives them considerable analysis in a lecture course repeated several times in the 1920's. Husserl 1966, 148-172; 2001a, 196-221. He tends to treat affection, however, as a "draw" (*Reiz*) or "pull" (*Zug*) exercised by the object upon the ego (Husserl 1966, 148, 150; Husserl 2001a, 196, 198) and thus uses the term affectivity much as we have the notion of reflexivity. What we mean by affectivity is much closer to Heidegger's concept of *Befindlichkeit*. For him *Befindlichkeit* is a mode of the Da of Dasein. See Heidegger 1928, §29, for example. In Heidegger's case, however, the term lacks the specific tie to the notion of consciousness and, thereby, the body that we are arguing for.

¹⁵ See Heidegger's well-known analysis of this in [1928] 1967, §18; 1962, §18.

¹⁶ This is to raise the question of whether haptic touching is an act or an action. The description already points to the way in which touch is situated between these two categories, being an action that is an act and an act-in-action. Unlike vision, where the action of walking around an object functions as a setting condition for the act of seeing, and unlike

speech, where the action of utterance is incidental to the act of speaking, the act of touching is identical to the action of touch in the case of haptic touch. The intention of the act, in turn, is always an intention-in-action. In order to maintain continuity with the earlier sections of this paper, however, I will begin by speaking of it as an act.

¹⁷ Husserl 1952, 146; Husserl 1989, 153. I am following Rojcewicz and Schuwer translation of *Empfindnisse* as *sensings*. It might also be rendered *sensorial feeling* or even *sensuous feeling*. While they abound in Heidegger, it is rare to find Husserl creating new terms. This seems to be a combination of *Empfindung* and *Erlebnis*, perhaps *sich befinden* as well, and has roughly the meaning of a sensorial bodily event that is immediately felt or "lived."

¹⁸ See the case of IW in Gallagher and Cole 1998, 134-135, 140-142.

¹⁹ See Welton 1983, 258-267 for a discussion of perceptual activities.

²⁰ Cf. Gallagher and Cole 1998, 132. This chapter slightly redistributes the three features that Gallagher and Cole include under "body schemes." According to Gallagher and Cole body schemata consist of proprioception, motor habits and some intermodal perceptual features, while we are placing only the latter two under the rubric of body schema. In any case, body schemata should not be confused with body images, which result from acts of reflecting upon the body. See pp. 131-140. This distinction fits neatly in my contrast between reflexivity and reflection. There is a question as to whether this structural distinction between body schema and body image does not need a genetic account of their interrelationship.

²¹ Gibson 1966, 114.

²² Aristotle, *De Anima*, Bk. 2, Chap. 11, 423-424 in Aristotle 1941, 579.

²³ Aristotle, *De Anima*, Bk. 2, Chap. 11, 423 in Aristotle 1941, 578-579.

²⁴ Gibson 1966, 113.

²⁵ From this perspective we can see that what Heidegger calls *Befindlichkeit*, affective attunement, is really an extension of Husserl's notion of *Empfindnisse* but one that severs any direct link to materiality. This is why the notion of fear, an affective but intentional state, and not studies as a bodily event, is his point of access to its analysis. If space permitted I would argue that he has a theory of embodiment, of *Leiblichkeit*, without a theory of the body, of *Leib*. See Heidegger [1928] 1967, §§ 29 & 30. For an argument against this claim see Levin 1999.

²⁶ Gibson 1966, 111.

²⁷ This provides the ontological support for the notion of reflexivity, an idea that we cannot pursue here.

²⁸ If perceptual schemata, body schemata and affectivity are preconscious, we can understand why they cannot be studied by a phenomenology or a philosophy that relies exclusively upon reflection and that takes consciousness as its irreducible field of analysis, as is typical in most self-awareness theories. In these theories consciousness can be grasped only in terms of what is manifest. As a consequence, the deeper sense in which consciousness is bodily is lost.

²⁹ Husserl 1952, 159; Husserl 1989, 167.

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