

## THE “CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” AND THE JUST WAR TRADITION

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### I. Introduction

It is not difficult to recognize that war produces culture. Can the converse be as easily claimed, however: that there are certain cultures that are war producing, that is, that they instigate and promote war? This is a dialectical question because all cultures have been produced by their history and those histories have been punctuated by war; thus they have been partially produced by war. On the other hand, some cultures, because of the way in which they were defined and ‘cultivated’ by war, place war making and the martial ethos at the center of their identity, and thus, it can be said, produce war. If the just war tradition has been one of the main theoretical devices developed over centuries to both justify and constrain war, we must necessarily ask: what role has ‘the just war tradition’ played in this dialectical interplay between culture and war? Or conversely, in what way has the interplay between war and culture produced ‘the just war tradition’? It is a central contention of this chapter that we must understand the evolution of the just war tradition, which produces the just war theories, in terms of the interplay between war and culture. I will deliberately use the term ‘just war tradition’ to refer to all the canonical texts as well as forms of arguing about the justifiability of war and killing. In contrast, I will restrict the use of ‘just war theory’ to a particular instance of the tradition. The theory makes no sense without the tradition, although a particular theory may make a contribution to the tradition. More concretely, I will argue that the just war tradition has undergone a series of profound transformations when humanity has faced some of its most severe and challenging ‘clash of civilizations.’ A subordinate but no less important thesis of this chapter is that the just war

tradition and its different theoretical enactments must also be understood as a type of *self-reflexive cultural hermeneutics* that aims to make explicit the assumptions of “Western” culture so that it can define itself and not be defined by its enmity. The just war tradition, therefore, is a type of critical self-reflection that aims at lessening cultural conflict, and in particular war, by redirecting our attention not to what our alleged enemies and foes have done to injure us, but rather towards what we consider to be morally integral to, and inviolable in, our cultural identities. The just war tradition evolved from the paradoxical situation of having to simultaneously justify and limit, allow and constrain, the violence of war. One of the ways it has contributed to the “management” of the violence of war is by urging within cultures a type of critical self-reflection that in our day has been enshrined and codified into a series of laws and regulations that seek to preserve the physical and moral integrity of soldiers and non-combatants. The first two parts of the chapter elaborate the historical aspect of the central thesis by focusing on two axial periods in the history of the West and the just war tradition. The third and last section focuses more narrowly on Huntington’s geopolitics of enmity and what I will call his *bunker cultural hermeneutics*<sup>1</sup>.

## II. Thou shall not kill, except...Saint Augustine against the Pagans

Elements of the just war tradition are older than Christianity. We find references to the justice or injustice of war in ancient writers, most notably Thucydides, who chronicled the famous Peloponnesian Wars that culminated in the defeat and ruin of Athens<sup>2</sup>. We also find elements of the tradition in the many epics and myths of ancient cultures that speak of the magnanimity of warriors and kings, thus indicating that there was a warrior code. Yet, it can be both forcefully and justifiably argued that the tradition begins to take clear shape when Saint Augustine sought

to justify Christian involvement in war and killing. The just war tradition is a tradition of rational arguments that seek to justify, defend, arbitrate and clarify the reasons why it may be necessary and right to go to war. The English name for the tradition is certainly an unfortunate literal translation of the Latin name: *jus ad bellum*. The Latin root does not immediately suggest that the theory is about the justice of war, or how a particular war may be just. Instead, at the root of the Latin phrasing is the process of justification, or rationalization, in the non-pejorative sense. It was Augustine who turned what up to then had been vaguely enunciated warrior codes and intercultural appeals to civility into a form of argumentation. If we use the original meaning of *apologia*, namely as a form of defense, then we can appreciate the ways in which Augustine's *apologia* for the Christian involvement in war and participating in killing laid down the theoretical foundations of a tradition that would seek to provide reasons and argument for why and when it would be 'justified' to go to war.

Saint Augustine dealt with the questions of war and killing in several places, and a proper study of Augustine's views on war would demand careful attention to all these different texts, but also their context of composition. Robert L. Holmes, fortunately, has produced a thorough and critical analysis of Augustine's views on war<sup>3</sup>. For our purposes, which are very different from those of Holmes, we will focus on two key texts, belonging to two very different periods in Augustine's life.

*De libero arbitrio* [On the Freedom of the Will], arguably one of the most important works of moral philosophy in the Western tradition, and surely among one of the most generative texts of the Augustian corpus, Augustine broaches the question of homicide, suicide, and killing in war. The book, presented in the form of a dialogue, is in fact a theodicy, that is, it is a work in which

Augustine seeks to make sense of evil in the world in light of the Christian doctrine of divine benevolence and omnipotence. Theodicy asks why there is evil if God is just and all creation is a product of God's goodness? In *De libero arbitrio* Augustine offers a radical and surprisingly simple answer: evil enters the world through our choosing. We produce evil by turning away from God's goodness and commandments. Why would we choose against God's goodness? According to Augustine, it is because of concupiscence, or, inordinate corporeal desire. We sin and bring evil into the world when we desire inordinately that which is of this world and momentarily satiates the appetites of the flesh. It is against this background that Augustine then broaches the questions of the killing of the soldier, putatively for the sake of another, killing in self-defense, and suicide. The last two are deemed sinful, for they arise from concupiscence, for killing another for the sake of one's life, or killing oneself, are forms of too deep an attachment to this world. Seemingly --for as we will see below not even killing done for duty is exempt from sin-- Augustine exempts killing under the command of the law from sin, so long as this killing is done without ire, desire, joy, or in revenge. For if the soldier kills because he enjoys it, then this killing is tainted by the sin of the desiring flesh. As Augustine writes, speaking through the character Evodius: "As for the soldier, in killing his enemy he is the servant of the law, and hence merely does his duty without any evil desire. Moreover the law itself, being made for the protection of the people, cannot be accused of concupiscence."<sup>4</sup> Robert Holmes has argued in the aforementioned work on Augustine, that this line of reasoning seems only possible if a distinction between a private and a public morality is first made. For what is allowed in public is different from what may take place within the conscience of the individual. This distinction is matched by another distinction, namely between a terrestrial or temporal and an immutable or transcendent law. Nonetheless, while most commentators stop at this apparent final justification of war killing, Augustine himself did not. Later on the dialogue, Augustine raises the question of

the morality of civil or human law. Through the voice of Evodius Augustine asks whether civil laws are not beholden to a “higher unwritten law,” that is, to divine providence. Augustine, commenting on Evodius, notes “I command and approve this distinction of yours [between civil and divine law]...For you see that the law that is made for the government of the state allows to go unpunished many things that yet are avenged by divine providence. And this is right; nor because it does not do everything should we find fault with what it does.”<sup>5</sup> The conclusion is ineluctable and translucent. Even if they are blameless in accordance with civil law, they may be sinning in accordance with divine law. Holmes summarizes these important, and often misquoted passages, in the following way, “What is important to see in all of this is that not only does Augustine not justify killing in personal defense, he does not justify killing in defense of another either, and he furthermore is unwilling to say that even those who kill as “public” persons are blameless in the eyes of God for the killing they do.”<sup>6</sup>

Augustine returns to some of these formulations in *De Civitate Dei* [The City of God, perhaps his singular most important philosophical-theological work. In book One, chapter 21 of *The City of God*, Augustine expands his earlier affirmations. Now, however, Augustine explicitly argues that “divine authority itself has made certain exceptions to the rule that is not lawful to kill men. These exceptions, however, include only those whom God commands to be slain, either by a general law, or by an express command applying to a particular person or a particular time.”<sup>7</sup>

Augustine refers to Abraham, Jephthah, and Samson as examples of the divine sword.

Interestingly, while Augustine writes about divine command, he also writes of a “just general law”<sup>8</sup> that commands to homicide, yet, he does not adduce examples in which anyone has been exempted from sin by such a general just law. In Book Nineteenth, chapter 7, Augustine returns to killing, but now in the context of so-called just wars. Imperial wars have brought about the

unification of peoples under an imperial city, with its laws and languages. And while these wars may have ended, the “misery of these evils [produced by war] have not yet come to an end.”<sup>9</sup> For these imperial wars have been perpetuated in the form of a worse kind of war, namely civil and social. “By these, the human race is made even more miserable, either by warfare itself, waged for the sake of eventual peace, or by the constant fear that conflict will begin again.”<sup>10</sup> Augustine laments that it would take too long to list the miseries and evil brought on by these wars, and then proceeds to ask whether in fact, there are just wars: “But the wise man, they say, will wage just wars. Surely, however, if he remembers that he is a human being, he will be readier to deplore the fact that he is under the necessity of waging even just wars.”<sup>11</sup> Augustine closes this section with an admonition, almost a condemnation, to the effect that the evils of war, even justified war, should not be accepted, for who endures them and accepts them, has lost his humanity.

The last place in *The City of God* where Augustine returns to the issue of war is precisely the last book, certainly one of the last texts that Augustine wrote. In chapter Six of book Twenty-two Augustine refers to Cicero’s discussion in *De Republica* concerning the difference between the death of individual humans and civic death, that is, the death of a city or state. Augustine glosses Cicero to the effect that because of Cicero’s belief that the world would not perish, cities must wage wars for their protection. Thus, a view of just war is imputed on Cicero by Augustine, one which more concretely argues that a city should wage war for either faith to the spirit of the commonwealth, in this case of the Roman commonwealth, or for the safety of the city, in particular. Augustine then proceeds to cast doubt on Cicero’s just war theory. For as he asks, illustrating with reference to the city of Saguntines, “he [Cicero] does not tell us which of the two is to be preferred if both faith and safety encounter the same peril at the same time, so that it

is not possible to hold onto the one without losing the other. For it is plain that if the Saguntines had chosen safety they must have broken faith; whereas by keeping faith they must certainly have relinquished their safety: as, indeed, they did.”<sup>12</sup> Since the context of this gloss on Cicero is to distinguish between the earthly, or terrestrial and humane, city from the divine city, Augustine concludes by noting that “The safety of the City of God, however, is of such a kind that it can be possessed, or rather acquired, only with faith and through faith; and when faith is lost, no one can attain to that safety.”<sup>13</sup> For this reason, while the city of Rome has not incited even one martyr, the city of God has occasioned legions of martyrs. Indeed, these remarks are ambivalent expression of Augustine’s condemnation of even so-called just wars. There is another place, however, where Augustine is quite explicit about his condemnation of war, and that is in a letter to Darius, a “high-ranking imperial official (*vir illustris*),” a Christian, sent by Rome to end the fighting between Boniface and the troops of the empire. In this letter to his Christian friend, written in 430, the year he died, Augustine writes: “Greatness and their own glory belong to warriors who are both very brave and very faithful (that is the source of the truer praise), to those who struggle and face danger in order, with the help of God who gives protection and assistance, to bring defeat upon and untamed enemy and win respite for the empire by pacifying the provinces. However, greater glory still is merited by killing not men with swords, but war with words, and by acquiring or achieving peace not through war but through peace itself.”<sup>14</sup>

Augustine reluctantly defended the need for Christians to participate in war, although both theologically and philosophically he could not reconcile himself to the sin of all killing, whether lawful or unlawful, for self-defense or in the defense of another. From the few places we quoted, a series of general principles have been derived that may be said to constitute the Augustinian just war theory, and as James Turner Johnson has enumerated them, they are: right authority, just

cause, right intent, the prospect of success, proportionality of good to evil done, and that it is the last resort<sup>15</sup>.

Yet, while all of the above has been in varying degrees contested and debated, few observers have noted the dual dependence of Augustine's views on war on the fact that Augustine is trying to justify the Christian faith before the pagans, and in turn to justify to the Christians the new role that they must play in what appeared to be a divine drama. In other words, Augustine's apologia is also an act of self-identification and self-presentation. To exculpate Christianity from the sac of Rome, also meant to be explicit about the positive, theological, and moral virtues of Christianity. As Christians, they are not the "enemies" of the Roman empire. It is human concupiscence and the evil it brings into the world that are the source of inequity and war. Indeed, the just war tradition makes its appearance as a discourse of self-identification in the face of an identity that is challenged or put in question by a new set of circumstance. Augustine is writing in the post-Constantinian period, after Christianity has ceased to be a persecuted sect of idolaters, and after it has become the official imperial creed. Furthermore, Augustine is writing more specifically in the aftermath of the plunder and sacking of Rome in 410 by Alaric, a Visigoth leader. The sacking of Rome sent many exiles to Carthage, where Augustine lived. It may be argued that *The City of God* was a direct response to the two questions that the fall of Rome brought to the lips of both Pagan and Christian Romans, namely whether the misfortune of Rome was punishment by the Pagan Gods for their abandonment of their duties of piety towards the gods, and now that Rome had become Christian, how could God have allowed such a misfortune to befall what was now a Christian city. *De Civitate Dei*'s response to these two is the argument that there is a divine plan that works through human history, a plan that is inscrutable to humans but that ultimately leads to the heavenly city that is above and beyond

history. In the end, while the theological and philosophical-historical theory behind Augustine's justification for the Christian participation in war may prove incoherent and untenable<sup>16</sup>, the principles of a just, or justifiable, war as were articulated by Augustine remain important to this day.

We can dispense with Augustine's philosophy of history, or more precisely his theodicy, as well as his uncoupling of civil and human law from divine law. What remains, nonetheless, is an attempt to constrain war by becoming explicit and painfully self-conscious about what is fundamental to one's moral identity in the face of a challenging cultural encounter. As Augustinian scholar Frederic H. Russell noted in his entry on "War" in an Encyclopedia on Augustine, "It is ironic that he [Augustine] is often seen as a theologian of war, for he was more a theologian of peace. No stranger to violence, he hated war but saw it as a consequence of sin that gave rise to many lusts."<sup>17</sup>

### III. The Discovery of 'Man' and the Invention of Peace

The 16<sup>th</sup> century was a pivotal age in the transformation of the cultural identity of Western culture. Some of these changes were registered as a new stage in the evolution of the just war tradition. The discovery of the new world in 1492 opened up both new territories and mental horizons to emergent European culture. The question of cultural and anthropological difference was of paramount importance for Europeans at the time precisely because the discovery of the new world exposed them to the relativity of their own culture. Now, European man discovery his uniqueness and difference, vis-à-vis a specimen of humanity that had no apparent relationship to anything that has been know up to that time. All of this has been amply studied and documented

by historians and philosophers. What has not been studied is the relationship between this discovery of “man,” or more specifically the discovery of radical cultural difference, and the transformation of the just war tradition during this century. The 16<sup>th</sup> century was probably one of the most formative periods in the evolution of the tradition because for the first time thinkers explicitly addressed the tradition and tried to formalize its principles. It is during this period that the tradition begins to explicitly differentiate between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, and most importantly, it is during these period that the tradition begins to think of itself less as a religious doctrine and more as a series of legal and moral norms that transcend religion and nation. International law, separate and distinct from canon law, begins to emerge at the moment when the just war tradition assumes a secular character. No two figures illustrate better these transformations of the just war tradition than do Bartolomé de las Casas, the so-called defender of the Indians, and Francisco de Vitoria, the father of international law and founder of the famous and influential Salamanca School<sup>18</sup>.

Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546) was professor at the famous theological school at Salamanca<sup>19</sup>. He is best known as the author of two works: *On the American Indians (De Indis)* and *On the Law of War (De Indis Relectio Posterior, sive de iure belli)*, which were based on lectures prepared during the years of 1537-8, but delivered as *Relectiones* (public lectures) in January and June of 1539 respectively. While they are known with separate titles, Vitoria conceived them as being part of one same cycle of lectures. In fact, a more accurate title, added on to the original manuscript by a later hand, would be “*De bello contra indios*” or “On the war against the indians.”<sup>20</sup> The first relection addresses one of the most fundamental questions raised by the discovery of the New World: whether the Spanish Crown had a right to claim sovereignty and control over these new lands. The question was both a theological and juridical one and it

entailed the fundamental notion of dominion. After considering and dismissing charges that Indians were irrational, barbarians, beast, children, and so on, Vitoria concludes that the Indians do have dominion over their world: “The conclusion of all that has been said is that the barbarians undoubtedly possessed as true dominion, both public and private, as any Christians. That is to say, they could not be robbed of their property, either as private citizens or as princes, on the grounds that they were not true masters (*ueri domini*). It would be harsh to deny to others, who have never done us any wrong, the rights we concede to Saracens and Jews, who have been continual enemies of the Christian religion. Yet we do not deny the right of ownership (*domini rerum*) of the latter, unless it be in the case of Christian lands which they have conquered”<sup>21</sup>

Thus, to the original question, whether the barbarian had dominion of their lands before the Spaniards arrived, Vitoria retorts unambiguously, “*that before arrival of the Spaniards these barbarians possessed true dominion, both in public and private affair.*”<sup>22</sup> These passages, indeed the entire relection, are remarkable in that Vitoria proceeds to dismantle the Aristotelian inspired theories about the natural slavery of the Indians, their moral minority, and thus their lack of dominion over their lands. In tandem, he points in the direction of the Jews and Moors, or Saracens, i.e. those who professed the religion of Islam, as a precedent for how to deal with the Indians. If these infidels and unbelievers do have dominion, both private and public, over their lands, why would not these other barbarians, asks Vitoria? If the Indians do have dominion over their lands, then what claim has the Spanish crown over these new lands? Vitoria is once again quite unambiguous and adamant: “It is clear from all that I have said that the Spaniards, when they first sailed to the land of the barbarians, carried with them no right at all to occupy their countries.”<sup>23</sup>

The second relection, entitled in English as “On the Law of War,” turns on the second question of whether it is just, or justifiable, to wage war against the Indians. While this relection has rightly become a foundational document in the just war tradition, we must not lose sight of its context, namely that it is about justifying, i.e. giving reasons for, waging war against so-called barbarians. The relection begins by laying out the scriptural sources that reject war and killing, but promptly proceeds to demonstrate that in fact in some cases wars may be lawful, although Vitoria offers more examples to counter the lawfulness of war than to buttress their justifiability<sup>24</sup>. Furthermore, on the authority of Augustine and Aquinas, Vitoria argues that it is lawful for Christians to engage in war. Vitoria then discusses on whose authority may war be declared and waged. In question 1, article 3 of this relection, Vitoria turns to the important question of “what are the permissible reasons and cause of just war?” In this section, Vitoria lays out some of the most explicit formulations in the just war tradition: none of the following can be cause for a just war: 1. differences in religion; 2. imperial expansion; 3. personal glory or convenience<sup>25</sup>. Under what conditions, then, can just war be waged: “the sole and only just cause for waging war is when harm has been inflicted.”<sup>26</sup> Yet, not any or every injury is grounds for a just war, for “it is not lawful to inflict cruel punishments such as death, exile, or confiscation of goods for all crimes indiscriminately, even on our own common people and native subjects of the realm.”<sup>27</sup>

In questions 2 and 3 of the relection on *The Law of War* Vitoria turns to the question of whether it is just and lawful to resist the call of a prince to engage in war, when this war is unjust. Vitoria answers in the affirmative. In question 3, we find perhaps some of Vitoria’s most important contributions to the development of the just war tradition as it is here that he discusses what “may be done in a just war,” or in other words, *jus in bello*. Here we find a discussion of non-

combatant immunity, collateral or double effect victims, plunder and enslavement of the vanquished, execution of hostages, whether all enemy combatants may be executed, execution of prisoners of war, and finally whether the vanquished may be disposed en toto or imposed especial monetary tributes by winners. Vitoria concludes by formulating three laws of war: 1. “since princes have the authority to wage war, *they should strive above all to avoid all provocations and causes of war*”; 2. “once war has been declared for just causes, the prince should press his campaign not for the destruction of his opponents, but *for the pursuit of the justice for which he fights and the defense of his homeland*”; 3. “once the war has been fought and victory won, he must use his victory with moderation and Christian humility.”<sup>28</sup> And with these three rules Vitoria closes by announcing that “And so I end this whole disputation about the Indians, which I have undertaken for the glory of God and the utility of my fellow-man.”<sup>29</sup>

Bartolomé de las Casas (1474-1566) towers over the 16<sup>th</sup> century as one of the most original thinkers and defenders of the rights and culture of the Indians<sup>30</sup>. For sure, however, he is the father of anthropology, ethnography, and one of the great historians<sup>31</sup>. His work has been re-discovered by Latin American liberation theologians, yet his impact and relevance reaches beyond theology. In contrast to Francisco de Vitoria, Bartolomé de las Casas’ contribution to political theory, law, and the just war tradition have remained underappreciated and even unknown<sup>32</sup>. Like Vitoria, de las Casas took on the same series of questions that Vitoria addressed in his *Relectiones* of 1539, as early as 1525 in a treatise that has come down to us only in a fragmentary way, namely *De Unico Vocationis Modo*, which has been translated as *The Only Way*<sup>33</sup>.

*De Unico Vocationis Modo* is a devastating rejection of holy war, and the idea that a war can be made just by appeal to the alleged duty to spread the gospel. In this treatise, de las Casas sets out to demonstrate that there is *only way* to bring the gospel to the people of the world, and that way is that of “persuasion of the understanding through reason, invitation and the soft action of the will,” and only this way should be applied to all human, in common, without distinction. The first thesis is proved by reference to two groups of arguments. One set makes reference to reason. The second set proves by illustration. In the first set de las Casas argues that the faith can only be brought to other people by appeal to reason and the understanding because: 1. faith is an action of the understanding, although ordered by the will; 2. because conversion concerns truths that are not evidently so by nature; 3. because the will is guided by the understanding; 4. because the evangelizer must learn the methods of preaching and rhetoric, which are arts; 5. because the way to lead men to faith should be the same as that which leads them to science; 6. because when we lack a natural method to achieve something, we make use of the arts and science, that is, reason; 7. and because persuasion and argumentation were the methods used by the ancient philosophers and wise men. In the second set, de las Casas refers to six examples: 1. This was the way used by the ancient saintly fathers; 2. because this way was the way of Christ; 3. because this was the way observed by the apostles and disciples of the Lord; 4. this was the way praised and defended by the fathers of the church; 5. because this way has been the practice observed by the Catholic Church; 6. as it is proved by all the decrees of the Church, among which are notable the papal bull *Sublimis Deus* and *Pastorale Officium*.

The second thesis, namely that the way of reason and persuasion are to be used with all peoples, without distinction, is defended with nine arguments: 1. because the faith of Christ in only one, and one is the evangelical law, and one is the rational nature of all humans; 2. because the

method of rational persuasion is integral to the human being, and God does not take away from any creature what is in their nature; 3. because there is no difference among the peoples, nor should there be when evangelizing them; 4. because there is no difference among the peoples, even if there are differences in election and predestination, although this should not make a difference when preaching to them; 5. Because when Christ sent forth his apostles he did not make distinctions as to peoples or places, nor as to the way to evangelize them; 6. because Christ taught the way to preach in the two apostolic missions, without distinguishing among them; 7. because of the authority of Saint Ambrosio; 8. by authority of Cicero; 9. and by authority of Saint John Chrysostom.

While a majority of contemporary thinkers, including some evangelizers, doubted the humanity and rationality of the Indians, de las Casas sets out from the assumption that they are, precisely because they have cultures, arts, myths, and moral rules, even if these differ from those that are familiar to Spaniards. Second, and just as importantly, de las Casas discerns at the center of Christianity the appeal to reason. As if preemptively refuting and rejecting the misappropriations of Aristotle by renaissance thinkers like Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, a translator of Aristotle, de las Casas focuses on Aristotle's rationalistic anthropology<sup>34</sup>. If the human being is by divine creation a rational creature, what is proper to its nature is the use of reason, argues de las Casas. He writes: "The rational creature has been born with the aptitude to be moved, lead, directed and attracted gently, with sweetness, with delicateness and softly, by its free will, in such a way that it will voluntarily hear, voluntarily obey, voluntarily adhere and submit."<sup>35</sup> Like Vitoria, de las Casas is also aware that Spain's claims to a just war for the sake of propagating the faith had already been challenged by the struggles against the Moors and Saracens. The use of the weapons of war for the sake of the cross and bible is to be condemned and rejected. Like

Augustine, over a millennium earlier, Vitoria and Augustine turned to the sources of their cultural identity not to justify war and bellicose ideologies, but rather in order to discern and make evident what is moral and a source of peace in that identity. Both, ultimately, find in the gospel of Christianity the voice of Jesus Christ, but above all, the voice of reason that augurs a lawful order of nations and peoples.

#### IV. Your enemies tell who you are and are not: Huntington's Bunker Cultural Hermeneutics

What justifies discussing Samuel P. Huntington along with Augustine, Vitoria, and de las Casas, notwithstanding their extreme differences, is that they all advised leaders and officials who could and did wage war. Furthermore, they all have contributed to the thinking of the role of the military in society. More specifically, even if they did not have the undivided attention of political leaders, their thinking influenced the way in which warriors, and today the professional soldier, conceived their role in society. While Huntington may not have expressly dealt with the just war tradition, his work has indirect consequences on it. Huntington, in fact, became quite famous and influential already in the late fifties when he published a book that is still used in military academies: *The Soldier and the State*<sup>36</sup>. In fact, this book pioneered a type of thinking that may be said to contribute tangentially to the just war tradition. The aim of this work was to elaborate a functional and normative analysis of civilian and military relations. Prescriptively, Huntington described the emergence of the professional soldier. The professional soldier is defined as a professional whose entire vocation, or professional calling, is determined by: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. For Huntington, the "client" of the professional soldier is "society," And his or her expertise has to do with the "management of violence." The military profession, furthermore, is bureaucratized and legalized by the rules and regulations that

arbitrate education, promotion, levels of competence, and lines of responsibility and command. This brief overview of Huntington's descriptive and prescriptive analysis of the military profession reveal how his work can be read as a contribution to the just war tradition. The aim of the professionalization of the military is not just its bureaucratization, but also the constraint of the violence that un-trained soldier can unleash.

For our purposes, we will focus on one of Huntington's most recent and influential books, namely *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*.<sup>37</sup> The central thesis of the book is deceptively simply: that cultural or civilizational identities have become the determining factor in shaping world politics and the new world order. The world order no longer depends on the conflict of ideologies, or the conflicts between the rich and the poor, or between so-called first world and third world nations. The fundamental fissure in world politics is the not just incipient but actual conflict of civilizations<sup>38</sup>. This is a deceptively simple thesis because it conceals a series of other theses that are then articulated as necessary and inevitable. Some of the axiomatic consequences of seeing the world as tearing apart at the seams of cultures, is that we are forced to assume that cultures are discrete identities, and that, furthermore, these identities have not been in mutual exchange, conflict, and dialogue, and furthermore, it subordinates nation-states to larger civilizational blocks that are dubious once submitted to closer analysis<sup>39</sup>. Huntington, interestingly, is articulating a geopolitical identity politics that urges Euro-American countries to circle the wagons against the already declared civilizational war, being waged primarily by the Sino-Islamic alliance against the so-called West. Huntington's belligerent identity politics, however, is a paradoxical and even self-contradictory combination of national monoculturalism and global multiculturalism. Huntington argues in this book that nations that have divided cultures end up belonging to neither, thus condemning themselves to perpetual

conflict: Mexico and Turkey are adduced as examples of this fractured identities. At the same time, Huntington argues that monoculturalism, or global cosmopolitanism with one universalistic culture, is impossible, undesirable and even immoral.

As Huntington writes towards the end of the book, putting upside down the entire legacy of Renaissance, Enlightenment and Romantic cosmopolitanism: “In the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous.”<sup>40</sup> It is false because globalization has given rise not to Westernization but to a form of indigenization; that is to say, in reaction to the forces that seek to homogenize, local cultures re-discover and revived their indigenous cultural practices and traditions. It is immoral because of the costs it would entail to bring it about, presumably because of the imperial wars it would require. Finally, it is dangerous because if the West were to undertake this civilizational mission, it could face its own demise. For this reason, those who have advocated a multiculturalist America have been contributing to the weakening of its Western identity, while seeking to make the world after the image of multicultural America. Neither route is desirable, both are dangerous: “The global monoculturalists want to make the world like America. The domestic multiculturalists want to make America like the world. A multicultural America is impossible because a non-Western America is not America. A multicultural world is unavoidable because global empire is impossible. The preservation of the United States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity. The security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality.”<sup>41</sup> For Huntington, however, this global multiculturality is a multiculturalism not of dialogic cosmopolitanism or solidaristic tolerance, but a multiculturalism of mutual enmity<sup>1</sup>. Identities, as

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we were told at the beginning of the book are a function of politics, of how we see ourselves in relationship to who we are not: “People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. *We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.*”<sup>42</sup> Tell me who your enemies are, and I will tell you who you are. It is this belligerent identity politics that I have called, perhaps oxymoronically, bunker hermeneutics because, in contrast to Augustine, Vitoria, and de las Casas, whose contributions to the just war tradition were based on a critical self-reflection of the norms and principles of one’s own culture, Huntington defines the political and culture, in terms of enmity and confrontation.

While Huntington’s *Foreign Affairs* 1993 article ends with a call to the co-existence among civilizations, his book ends with a call to arms: “In the clash of civilizations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately. In the greater clash, the global “*real clash*,” between Civilization and barbarism, the world’s great civilizations, with their rich accomplishments in religion, art, literature, philosophy, science, technology, morality, and compassion, will also hang together or hang separately. In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war.”<sup>43</sup> The last sentence would be credible if it had not been eviscerate of all meaning by the preceding three hundred pages in which civilizations have been portrayed as bleeding at edges of their encounter and friction. What remains is Huntington’s beating of the drums, calling us to face the clash of civilizations, an euphemism for Islamic jihad against the West, in which civilization confronts barbarism, men face beasts, and reason confronts irrationality and blind faith. It was precisely against this way of portraying the world that the just war tradition was developed. The tradition’s most transformative moments in fact have come about when its contributors have sought to think

outside the bunker of cultural wars, by stepping into the open and light halls of reason and justice.

If Samuel P. Huntington's work *The Soldier and the State* contributed substantively to the constraint of lawless and brutal violence, inasmuch as he urged for a further professionalization of the military, his most recent work has fanned the fires of cultural conflict and enmity. His simplistic and belligerent analysis of "cultures" and "civilizations" are like spades digging war trenches. Fortunately, in the United States we have other thinkers intervening on the side of the management and control of violence, and one such thinker and statesman is Robert McNamara. In fact, almost in diametrical opposition to Huntington's bunker hermeneutics, McNamara has called for what I would like to call a hermeneutics of empathy. In *Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, co-written with James G. Blight shortly before 9-11, but expanded with a lengthy Afterword to the paperback edition, McNamara enunciated three imperatives that should guide U.S. and world relations<sup>44</sup>: 1. The moral imperative, which demands that the primary goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to prevent the replication of the 20<sup>th</sup> century carnage –160 million dead-- in the 21<sup>st</sup> century; 2. The multilateral imperative, which demands that the U.S. provide leadership, but without applying its military, economic, and political might unilaterally. And 3<sup>rd</sup>, the empathy imperative, added after 9-11, which commands: "The West, led by the United States, must seek by all possible means to increase its understanding of the history, culture, religion, motives, and attitudes of those who have declared themselves to be its adversaries."<sup>45</sup> For McNamara, empathy is not sympathy, nor is it a carte blanche to engage in moral relativism that condones everything and censors nothing. Empathy cures us of the Manichaeism hubristic moral clarity incites. As McNamara clarifies, instead of moral clarity, he advocates what U.S. philosopher and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr

called “moral accuracy.” To approximate “moral accuracy” we must begin with the question Neibuhr asked: “how much evil [read suffering and killing] must *we* do in order to do good.”<sup>46</sup> It is this very question that haunted Augustine, Vitoria, de las Casas, and that in our day Huntington refuses to ask, but which McNamara has once again asked. It is this question that the just war tradition is always trying to answer and clarify by both offering reasons for when it may be necessary to go to war, while also offering rules and laws for the constraint of war.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> ‘bunker cultural hermeneutics’ is a term I coined by way of world historian William H. McNeill, who thought that Huntington’s work exhibits a “bunker mentality.” See William H. McNeill, “Decline of the West?” *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January 9, 1997), 21.

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian Wars* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1998).

<sup>3</sup> Robert L. Holmes, *On War and Morality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), chapter four: “St. Augustine on the Justification of War,” 114-145. See also the indispensable entry on “war” by Frederick H. Russell in Allan D. Fitzgerald, O.S.A., general editor, *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 875-876

<sup>4</sup> St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, trans. Carroll Mason Sparrow (Charlottesville: Dietz Press, Inc. 1947), 1.5.12, quoted in Holmes, *On War and Morality*, 123-24.

<sup>5</sup> Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.5.13, quoted in Holmes, *On War and Morality*, 126.

<sup>6</sup> Holmes, *On War and Morality*, 127.

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<sup>7</sup> St. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagan* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1.21, 33. Henceforth the first number refers to the book, the second to the chapter in that book, and the third, to the page in the Cambridge edition.

<sup>8</sup> St. Augustine, *The City of God*, 1.21, 34.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 19.7, 928.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 19.7, 929.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 19.7, 929.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 22.6, 1118.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 22.6, 1118-1119.

<sup>14</sup> Augustine, *Political Writings* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 226.

<sup>15</sup> James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 123.

<sup>16</sup> See Holmes, *On War and Morality*, 140-142.

<sup>17</sup> Frederick H. Russell, "War" in Allan D. Fitzgerald, general editor, *Augustine through the Ages: an encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids: Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 875-876.

<sup>18</sup> There is now an exhaustive and brilliant study of this famous school, Juan Belda Plans, *La Escuela de Salamanca y la renovación de la teología en el siglo XVI* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2000).

<sup>19</sup> For the following see James Brown Scott, *The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations* (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1934).

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<sup>20</sup> Francisco de Vitoria, *Political Writings* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 231.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 251.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 251. Italics in original.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 264

<sup>24</sup> Vitoria, *Political Writings*, 296.

<sup>25</sup> Vitoria, *Political Writings*, 302-3.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 303.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 304.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 327. Italics in original.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 327.

<sup>30</sup> See Lewis Hanke, *Bartolomé de las Casas. An Essay in Spanish Historiography* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1952).

<sup>31</sup> Lewis Hanke, *Bartolomé de las Casas: pensador, politico, historiador, antropólogo* (Buenos Aires: Eudeba Editorial Universitaria, 1968).

<sup>32</sup> A rare exception is of course Lewis Hanke, who has written on de las Casas as a political philosopher, see Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 2002 [1949]), 153-155. Hanke also has noted de las Casas' contribution to the just war tradition, *ibid.*, 133-146. See also Ramon-Jesus Queraltó Moreno, *El Pensamiento Filosófico-Político de Bartolome de las Casas* (Sevilla, Spain: Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, 1976), chapter 5, section 3 has a synoptic discussion of Lascacian thinking on just war, 255-281.

<sup>33</sup> Bartolomé de las Casas, *The Only Way* (New York: Paulist Press, 1992).

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- <sup>34</sup> See Lewis Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World* (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1959).
- <sup>35</sup> Bartolomé de las Casas, *Obras Completas. Vol. 2. De Unico Vocationis Modo*, 25.
- <sup>36</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).
- <sup>37</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: A Touchstone Book, 1997 [1996]).
- <sup>38</sup> Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, 20-21.
- <sup>39</sup> See Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Definitions” in Edward W. Said, *Reflections on Exile and other essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 569-590.
- <sup>40</sup> Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, 310.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 318.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 21. Italics added.
- <sup>43</sup> Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, 321
- <sup>44</sup> Robert McNamara and James G. Blight, *Wilson’s Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003).
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 234.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 271. Italics in the original.